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The U.S. has dedicated considerable thought to 
preparing for, responding to, and treating children 
in the event of a terrorist attack. However, most of 
the literature addressing children and terrorism 
considers children as collateral victims as opposed 
to the intended targets. The case of American 
children as intended targets of terrorism demands 
attention as it stands as a potential reality with 
implications– from triage and long-term treatment 
to legal and ethical issues –that are largely 
unconsidered. 
  
For the most part, research and infrastructure 
strategies to enhance terrorism preparedness and 
response have been focused on generic population 
considerations in lieu of explicit attention to the 
needs of specific demographics such as the elderly, 
institutionally confined, or children. That said, 
there have been some notable exceptions, 
particularly in looking at the specific needs of 
children who may be victims of wide-impact 
attacks with non-conventional weapons. For 
instance, the federal Bioterrorism Act of 2002 
mandated that preparedness planning using federal 
money must include specific a focus on children. As 
such, certain federal agencies, notably the Agency 
for Health Research and Quality, have helped 
assure that this guidance is indeed followed and 
understood. At the state level, several states 
including California, Connecticut, New Jersey, and 
New York have passed, or are in the process of 
passing, legislation directly addressing children and 
terrorism. In the non-governmental arena, the 
American Academy of Pediatrics created a special 
task force on terrorism, now called the Disaster 
Preparedness Team. 
   
In spite of these efforts, no systematic protocols 
have been adopted for preparing, responding to, or 
treating children in the event of a terrorist attack. 
This problem is compounded when considering the 
case if children are intentionally targeted. Yet this 
gap in U.S. planning for children as intended 
targets of terrorism is not without reason. While 
children as intended targets has received some 
consideration in foreign states such as Israel, Iraq, 
Nepal, and Russia where terrorists have explicitly 
and successfully targeted children, there has not 
been an attack of this nature on American soil and 
the topic is one that is difficult for health 
providers, media, and public officials to broach. 
Nonetheless, a growing body of evidence suggests 
that terrorists in general and Al Qaeda specifically 
may well have such scenarios in mind. Though it is 
clear there are appropriate steps that can be taken 
to prevent potential attacks, it also must be 
recognized that attacks may occur regardless of the 
best-laid plans. Thus, it is essential for the health, 
public health, education and other child 
congregate bodies, and first responder systems to 
prepare for a scenario with mass casualties of 
children followed by long-term pediatric care and 
mental health services for surviving victims as well 




First Meeting of the Working Group on 
Children as Intended Targets of 
Terrorism 
 
The working group was an assembly of top thinkers 
who through their professional and personal 
endeavourers stand poised to consider the 
implications of children as explicit targets of 
terrorism and provide directions for research and 
policy. The group was structured to be a small, 
select convergence of high-level persons situated in 
a forum of free discussion. An underlying objective 
of the group is for participants to be a resource for 
each other as well as select communities including 
policy makers and media. The group will convene 
periodically as issues emerge and research 
directions develop.  
 
The meeting was structured around four 
conversations: Veracity of the threat; Prevention 
and Preparedness; Health System Response; and 
Psychological Consequences.  This meeting report 
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Irwin Redlener, M.D.  
Director, National Center for Disaster Preparedness 
Associate Dean, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University 
 
To say that the world has changed since September 
11, 2001 has become a cliché.  And, if there was 
ever any doubt that America’s homeland is indeed 
vulnerable to the long and deadly reach of 
international terrorism, that day of well 
orchestrated attacks, using fully loaded jetliners, 
put a punctuated end to any delusion of an 
American fortress, impenetrable by highly 
committed and capable extremists bent on doing 
great harm to the nation.   
 
Actually, the first bombing of the World Trade 
Center in 1993 could have served almost as well as 
a wake-up call, though few really took that 
seriously enough to appreciably change public 
opinion, not to mention counter-terror policies or 
procedures.  In fact, it could be said that the ’93 
incident was treated more like a “snooze alarm” 
than a wake-up call.  It got our attention for a 
while, but didn’t really result in fundamental 
changes which might have made a difference in 
2001. 
 
The utter shock among Americans and in our 
government that was precipitated by 9/11 was 
understandable.  There was something grotesque 
and unimaginable about the use of passenger jets 
attacking unsuspecting targets in New York City and 
Washington, D.C.  Although terrorism is 
internationally ubiquitous, used as a technique to 
demoralize societies and nations since the 
beginning of human conflict, the 9/11 attacks were 
nonetheless unique in many respects.  This was 
perhaps the most complex, high tech, low cost 
attack ever devised against any country in history.  
The intricate, patient planning, from recruitment 
to flight training of the perpetrators to schedule 
coordination and target selection was a study in 
evil determination.  
 
The consequences of the attack are well known.  
Thousands of lives lost, destruction of New York 
City financial landmarks and a direct hit on the 
Pentagon were apparent immediately after the 
attack.  But years later, the lingering consequences 
remain.  Massive changes were instituted in 
government, an entire “preparedness” movement 
was created and thousands of people still suffer 
from lingering stress and trauma.  From the 
terrorists perspective, 9/11 and its aftermath were 
probably viewed as a grand success. 
 
That reality concerns us.  Will the success of 9/11 
embolden the same or other groups to strike again?  
That more attacks are essentially inevitable is hard 
to refute.  The fires of discontent have been stoked 
continuously since 9/11 and those who wish to do 
great harm to the nation are likely to be far more 
numerous and technically advanced than they were 
in 2001. 
 
All of this has correctly led the U.S. government to 
develop agencies, programs and strategies to 
detect, prevent or mitigate further terror attacks.  
This process has been extraordinarily expensive and 
highly disruptive to other national priorities.  Yet it 
 7 
is essential that we attempt to be more aware of 
potential threats and consequences associated with 
future.  Of course this requires paying attention to 
a wide sweep of scenarios from bioterrorism to 
attacks with nuclear or chemical weapons of mass 
destruction. 
 
Among the possibilities, sadly, is the potential for 
an attack that is targeted against children – the 
softest of “soft targets” and the most potentially 
provocative in terms of public reaction.  School 
sites and facilities are considered soft targets, 
vulnerable to devastating attacks because access is 
relatively simple, absolute security virtually 
impossible, and the potential for terror-induced, 
high degrees of societal-wide grief and reaction are 
assured.  Sadly, such a possibility cannot be ruled 
out, as is suggested by events and discoveries over 
the past few years including:  
 
 In late 2001, a planned attack on an 
American school in Singapore was thwarted 
by counter-terrorism officials. 
 The unspeakable 2004 attack on a school in 
Beslan, Russia where more than 150 
children were slain before the perpetrators 
could be neutralized by authorities. The 
concern is, of course, that a Beslan-style 
attack on a U.S. school or campus cannot 
be dismissed as a potential future threat 
and that we are poorly positioned to 
respond to the specific needs of children in 
a mass casualty incident. 
 In 2004, an Iraqi insurgent captured in 
Baghdad discovered to have had detailed 
plans and layouts of eight school districts 
across six U.S. states. 
 The emergence of attacks on schools as a 
more mainstream tool of warfare and 
terrorism—with the intentional targeting of  
a primary school in Afghanistan in 2006 and 
explosives attacks on both a group of 20 
children playing soccer as well as a suicide 
bomb attack at a college in Baghdad, both 
in February, 2007.  The next month, 32 
children and teachers were taken hostage 
in March, 2007 in Manila by armed gunmen. 
 Writings by al Qaeda leaders have spoken 
to the mandate to attack U.S. citizens in 
general and children in particular. Sulieman 
Abu Gheith, a Bin Laden lieutenant, 
reportedly stated the following: “We have 
not reached parity with [the Americans].  
We have the right to kill 4 million 
Americans, 2 million of them children…” 
 
Perhaps the point is that the United States cannot 
afford to be sanguine about the potential dangers 
facing our children and young people, even if the 
risk seems low.  The risk of occurrence must be 
balanced by considering the potential for extreme, 
widespread, and crippling repercussions of such an 
event occurring without adequate preparedness in 
place.   
 
It was our hope that by convening a panel of 
experts who could discuss the risks and 
consequences of terrorism directed at our children, 
we could elevate awareness and promote policies 
that would maximize the nation’s ability to prevent 




Topic 1: Veracity of the Threat 
Irwin Redlener, M.D. 
Director, National Center for Disaster Preparedness, Columbia University 
 
The impact of 9/11 on the American psyche was 
absolutely extraordinary, but it could have been 
worse: for example, what if there had been 
secondary attacks on places where 
children congregate with biological 
or radiologic agents?  There are 
reasons why terrorists target 
economic and financial centers, but 
there are also reasons why they 
might target places where children 
congregate. It is distressing to think about, but kids 
and the places they congregate are very soft 
targets. They’re symbolically important, besides 
being treasures of American families and 
communities.  Consequently, we do need to think 
about how the systems (school, law, health care) 
would respond to a situation in which children were 
targeted and/or there were mass pediatric injuries.  
We know that terrorists are not afraid to use 
children. It happened in Beslan, Russia when a 
school was attacked and children were held 
hostage. Many of them were killed.  What would we 
do if 500 American children were being held 
hostage by Beslan-like attackers?  How strongly 
would we adhere to negotiation strategies and 
policies that were conceived advance? How long 
would those policies last in the environment where 
the lives of children were being directly 
threatened?  
 
These are all questions we don’t know the answers 
to. But one day, we may have to face them.  
 
Is there evidence that children are being 
targeted?   
 
We found evidence that there is. It didn’t get a lot 
of media coverage, but there was a 
plan to attack the American school 
in Singapore, which had about 3,000 
American expatriate kids enrolled.  
The attempt, luckily, was thwarted 
at the last minute. In Nepal and in 
the Middle East, we’ve children are not off the 
radar screen in armed conflict and violence. So 
what can we do to better protect children? I’ll 
discuss four ideas.   
 
Promotion of the international 
rejection of child-focused terrorism.   
 
Terrorism has existed since the beginning of 
humankind in all conflicts and it will continue to 
exist. However, I think the overt rejection of child-
focused terrorism—if rejection is made repeatedly 
and strongly from leaders around the world--- 
would be helpful in minimizing the risks of children 
being directly targeted.    
 
Enhancement of security in our 
nation’s schools and other child 
congregate facilities.  
 
These data are from a Marist poll sponsored by the 
National Center of Disaster Preparedness.  
 
Unfortunately, even though 50% of the general 
public believes schools are vulnerable, only 41 
percent of parents are aware of the existence of an 






 Half of the American 
public believes that 
schools are a likely or 
a very likely target of 
terrorism. 
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degree of parental awareness 
differs among cultural and economic 
groups.  According to our poll, 
Latinos have a higher level of 
unawareness of what’s going on in 
the schools than do other ethnic 
groups. This disconnect between 
school officials and the communities 
they are serving could result in 
major problems in times of actual 
emergencies. Some of the questions I hope we’ll 
address today are:  How should we make schools 
less vulnerable to attack?  And what do we want 
the schools to look like?  How far are we willing to 
go to create a visible sense of security? We need to 
be cognizant not to create schools that look or feel 
like fortresses. Increasing safety while preserving 
the American value of freedom is tough, and I’m 
not sure we’ve found the balance yet.   
 
 Training of first responders  
 
 
If there is an emergency situation involving 
pediatric patients, the children will need 
specialized treatment. First responders need to be 
capable of recognizing and handling specific 
pediatric issues in emergency response and familiar 
with pediatric protocols. Children may respond 
much more quickly and much more significantly to 
particular noxious agents in their environment.  For 
example, if gas that is heavier than air is released 
into the environment as a toxic substance, it will 
be much more concentrated around children’s 
breathing areas than adults’. Additionally, 
children’s respiratory rates are much faster than 
adults.  
So over a period of time, because of 
the concentration of the substance 
and because of their breathing 
rates, children will take in much 
more toxic substance per body 
weight than adults will.  Secondly, 
children’s skin surfaces are much 
more permeable, therefore much 
more likely to absorb certain kinds 
of substances than adults’. They’re 
also much more likely to become dehydrated and 
go into shock.   
 
Being Cognizant of the Psychological 
Effects on Children  
 
The world’s not going to get gentler and softer and 
more peaceful necessarily anytime soon.  The 
questions is how do we understand that, 
acknowledge it, and still have our children grow up 
happy, healthy, thriving, looking forward to the 
future, not being consumed by fear.  I hope we’ll 
touch on some of these questions in our last 
presentation, on the psychological impact of 







 Children are really not 
just little adults, even 
though most adult 
emergency room 
physicians and adult 
emergency planners 
may envision them 
that way. 
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Response to: Veracity of Threat 
Chris Farrell 
Director of Research, Judicial Watch 
 
History of Children as Targets  
There’s nothing new to children being targets of 
terrorism. Children are soft targets of enormously 
high value.  In 1974, Palestinian terrorists raided a 
high school in Israel. They entered the school 
dressed as Israeli soldiers, took possession and 
killed a number of the children.  In Northwestern 
Islamabad, Pakistan, a Christian school for kids of 
non-governmental aid workers was attacked by 
some radical Islamists, and children were killed.  
 
I’d like to talk about the threat of 
terrorism or the targeting of 
children in light of the attack in 
Beslan, Russia. The threat of a 
similar event happening in our 
country is real. In recent years in 
the US, we’ve gone to great lengths 
to try to secure governmental 
buildings, economic and military targets. This has 
left schools and hospitals wide open.  U.S. schools 
house approximately 53 million kids on a daily 
basis. It would be relatively easy to scout these 
targets; the attack itself would be a breeze for 
dedicated, armed terrorists.  
 
It is important to understand the circumstances and 
the conditions that lead to the attack of the school 
in Beslan, Russia. The background information 
illuminates what we need to consider in the future. 
In 1991, the Soviet Union was falling apart and 
Chechnya declared its independence.  As the 
governmental and social structures started to 
dissolve, there was an increasing Arabization of 
what were militant Chechnyan Islamists.  The strict 
discipline and radical militancy was adopted within 
Chechnya and the region became a terror test bed. 
This is where the truck bomb was perfected, where 
the concept of using a cellular phone to detonate 
backpack bombs was created. They’ve been told, 
“Go out and do good work.”  The Chechnyans 
operate as part of a networked, autonomous 
cooperation, from cells that don’t need direction 
from Osama Bin Ladin and they’re interpretation of 
good work is what we experience in 
terror.   
 
Shamil Basayev is the godfather of 
Chechnyan terrorists.  He’s a figure 
who has dominated Chechnyan life 
since 1991, politically, militarily, as 
a terrorist.  He seized a hospital 
with 16 hundred patients in June of 
’95, engaged in a three-day shoot-out with the 
Russian army and won.  He was responsible for the 
first time a dirty bomb was placed in a city. 
Although it did not detonate, he planned for it to 
explode in the largest park in Moscow.  Notice the 
first dirty bomb was not planned to explode in 
Chechnya.  Basayev wanted to bring the war to 
Moscow.  That’s a huge part of his/their objective--
-to bring the fight not on their own ground, but to 
where you are and let you experience what their 
pain is.  Another objective is the constant evolution 
of learning that takes place with series of attacks.   
 
 Things you see occur 
in Chechnya now 
manifest themselves 
later around the 
world, whether it’s a 
year or two years or 
three years. 
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Theater Siege, the Precursor of Beslan 
In October of 2002, 46 people, including 19 female 
suicide bombers barged into a theater in Moscow 
and took 900 people hostage. Their tactics involved 
planting a large explosive device in the center of 
the room and stringing about 20 additional bombs, 
scattered throughout the audience. Because the 
theater was showing a musical comedy, there were 
many families and children present during the 
siege. The message- no one is getting out—was 
clearly sent.   
 
Using Women as Suicide Bombers 
As mentioned, 19 of the terrorists were female 
suicide bombers--called black widows. The were 
called black widows because they were literally 
widows.  They were Chechnyan women who lost 
husbands, brothers, fathers, and decided that their 
way to exact revenge was to engage in a suicide 
bombing.  The black widows mingled among the 
rest of the theater crowd, wearing bomber vests 
that they could detonate simply by putting two 
wires together. Normally, in hostage or siege 
situations, one of the first things that are done is 
communications are cut off, but not in this case.  
The Chechnyans forced people to use their cell 
phones to call family, friends, media, elected 
officials.   The message from the hostage takers, 
from the terrorists, over and over again to the 
people held in the theater was--- we want to die 
more than you want to live.  And that is what was 
repeated to the people in the theater, to the 
media, to the politicians and to the outside world. 
Eventually, the situation was resolved when Russian 
security forces pumped gas (believed to be a nerve 
agent), into the theater. 129 people died from the 
effects of the gas. It’s believed that probably more 
than half could’ve survived, but did not in part 
because they couldn’t get the ambulances in to get 
the people out.   
 
Seige of School in Beslan, Russia   
 The horrific event of the school in Beslan, Russia 
being taken hostage did not happen in a vacuum.  
It was part of a terror campaign that ran over eight 
days.  Two planes flying out of Moscow were blown 
up within half an hour of each other. There were 
bombings on Moscow’s metro and a number of 
other instances or incidences as well is this eight-
day period.  One of the tragedies was the Russian 
government had eight to 10 days warning that a 
school would be attacked.  That warning provided 
by our Central Intelligence Agency to the Russian 
government. How did the terrorists get across those 
borders?  How did this large group of people get out 
of Chechnya, across Ingushetia and into Ossetia and 
into the town completely unnoticed?  There are 
accusations that a $20,000 bribe at the border 
made it happen.  We don’t know.  
 
What we do know is that the terrorists learned 
lessons from the experiences in the theater siege 
and applied these lessons to the terrorism in 
Beslan:   
 
The hostages were dispersed.  
 
Most were kept in a large gymnasium, but others 
were taken up onto different floors of the building.  
 
There was a dead man switch on the 
bomb.  
 
One of the things that was used in the Dubrovka 
Theater was a detonator that had to be actively 
engaged to set the bomb off.  That’s why when the 
gas was sprayed into the building, folks passed out, 






But the terrorists learned. In the school siege, they 
used pedal actuated trigger. So when of the 
terrorists constantly has his foot on the pedal.  If 
you shoot him, which is what happened, which is 
believed to be what happened, if he’s gassed, and 
he ever releases his foot off the pedal, the bombs 
go off.  This is what I talked about, adopting and 
adapting, constantly revising and learning from the 
last set of strikes.   
 
Windows were broken and the terrorist 
shut down the heating and cooling 
system of the school.  
 
Why?  They didn’t want to be subject to any kind of 
a gas, so they ensured there was proper ventilation 
in the school.  The terrorists themselves had gas 
masks.   
 
Standing orders and contingencies were 
issued to the bombers inside.   
 
One of the problems in the theater siege was they 
weren’t told specifically go ahead to detonate; 
they didn’t receive direct orders to blow 
themselves up, so they didn’t do it.  In Beslan, they 
were given standing orders. The suicide bombers 
were instructed that if anything weird happened, if 
they heard shooting, you hear shooting, blow 
yourself up.  Any movement by any of the security 
forces against the compound, detonation.  That’s 
the, those are the standing orders give.  They 
weren’t present in Dubrov- in the theater siege.    
 
The result was a 53-hour siege of unparalleled 
brutality. The torture that was done is 
unspeakable.  To start off, every male over the age 
of 14 was gathered up and executed, with the idea 
that anyone who could pose a physical threat would 
be immediately eliminated.  
Closer to Home: Threats from Al Qaeda  
This huge effort over the last four years or so to 
decapitate Al Qaeda; however, it is a movement, 
not an organization.  What has happened is that 
we’ve diffused Al Qaeda and now autonomous 
networks, little cellular operations are scattered 
around the world. Because of the diffused 
operating environment, we’re not as able to track 
the movements and the trends, so there’s a 
double-edged sword to the diffusion of Al Qaeda.  
Some of the leadership is taken out but then 
smaller organizations, operating more broadly are 
dispersed throughout the globe.  The militant 
element is pretty small, but they’re very effective, 
and they have a huge support base at the second 
and third tier.  
 
Second tier are the supporters who provide 
administration and logistics.  They’ve got safe 
houses, accommodation addresses, vehicles.  
They’re not going to pull the trigger or detonate 
the bomb, but they’re going to provide all the 
infrastructure that allows that to occur. Third tier 
are those folks who are not actively going to 
participate in anything, but they support it, 
financially, philosophically, emotionally, among 
friends, in discussions, at a mosque.  That third tier 
is also very important; outside the United States, 
particularly in Southeast Asia, it’s an enormously 
powerful movement.  We’re in the era of suicide 
terror.   
 
Understanding Psychology of Suicide 
Terror  
 
What are the objectives in Arab suicide terror? The 
first objective is to attack the mind and will of the 
enemy by maximizing chaos, death and disorder.  
Suicide terror results in instant psychological 






the fact that it works.  It’s inexpensive, enormously 
precise, and when it comes to getting the message 
out, it’s irresistible to the media. There’s a 
religious justification by the suicide bombers 
themselves, at least those that are doing it (in 
front of the) the rubrics of Al Qaeda because 
there’s this notion that Heaven is gained by doing 
it. There’s a financial incentive because very often, 
annuities are paid to the families of the bombers 
themselves.  So a suicide bomber achieves heaven 
and provides for his family.  It’s a package deal.   
  
The signal that has to go out to the general public 
is you are not safe, and there’s no way the 
government can protect you.  And over the long 
term, in a dedicated campaign, that is corrosive to 
the state.  It undoes, it tears our fabric as a 
society, as a government.  You cannot survive it 
over the long haul.  It’s devastating.  So with the 
message being you’re not safe, and the government 
can’t protect, those are some of the, that’s the 
background tape playing in your head, when you 
have this series of events over time.   How long 
does it roll around in your head, and when you’re 
raising children where that’s the steady input, 
what’s the effect?   
 
Along with schools, children’s hospitals are other 
soft targets of high value.  It’s not too terrible 
different, but the emotional appeal, when you’re  
in name-the-city Children’s Hospital, and that 
hospital’s been seized, it’s just another ratcheting 
up of what the, of what could be done, or what 
could be seen to be exploited for terror.   
 
What lessons did the terrorists learned in Beslan 
that will likely be applied to the next event?  
 
 There were two divisions within the terrorist 
group: (1) Jihadis who were ready and willing to 
die and (2) mercenaries, who had planned to 
escape and didn’t think death was inevitable.  
There was only one survivor of the terrorists who 
seized the building—that person was part of the 
mercenary group. Next time I don’t think they’ll 
use a mercenary group.  
 
Understanding Psychology of Suicide 
Terror  
 
What are the objectives in Arab suicide terror? The 
first objective is to attack the mind and will of the 
enemy by maximizing chaos, death and disorder.  
Suicide terror results in instant psychological 
paralysis. Arab suicide terror is characterized by 
the fact that it works.  It’s inexpensive, enormously 
precise, and when it comes to getting the message 
out, it’s irresistible to the media. There’s a 
religious justification by the suicide bombers 
themselves, at least those that are doing it (in 
front of the) the rubrics of Al Qaeda because 
there’s this notion that Heaven is gained by doing 
it. There’s a financial incentive because very often, 
annuities are paid to the families of the bombers 
themselves.  So a suicide bomber achieves heaven 
and provides for his family.  It’s a package deal.   
  
The signal that has to go out to the general public 
is you are not safe, and there’s no way the 
government can protect you.  And over the long 
term, in a dedicated campaign, that is corrosive to 
the state.  It undoes, it tears our fabric as a 
society, as a government.  You cannot survive it 
over the long haul.  It’s devastating.  So with the 
message being you’re not safe, and the government 
can’t protect, those are some of the, that’s the 
background tape playing in your head, when you 
have this series of events over time. How long does 
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it roll around in your head, and when you’re raising 
children where that’s the steady input, what’s the 
effect?   
 
Along with schools, children’s hospitals are other 
soft targets of high value. It’s not too terrible 
different, but the emotional appeal, when you’re 
in name-the-city Children’s Hospital, and that 
hospital’s been seized, it’s just another ratcheting 
up of what the, of what could be done, or what 
could be seen to be exploited for terror.   
 
What lessons did the terrorists learned in Beslan 
that will likely be applied to the next event?  
 
 There were two divisions within the terrorist 
group: (1) Jihadis who were ready and willing to 
die and (2) mercenaries, who had planned to 
escape and didn’t think death was inevitable.  
There was only one survivor of the terrorists who 
seized the building—that person was part of the 
mercenary group. Next time I don’t think they’ll 




Topic 2: Preparedness and Prevention 
Speaker: William Modzeleski 
Department of Education, Office of Safe and Drug Free Schools 
 
I want to start by saying that  schools in the United 
States are safe. If you take a careful look at the 
data and you put what’s going on in schools in 
context, you will come to the conclusion that 
schools are safe places for kids to be. They are 
safer than many of the communities the student 
live in, and they’re even safer than some of the 
families they live with.   
 
That being said, the response to how we deal with 
crime and violence in schools is evolving.  I see 
three very distinct phases of school safety and 
school planning: (1) Before Columbine (BC) era, (2) 
After Columbine (AC) era, (3) and the Post 911 era.  
 
 In the BC era, we were somewhat lackadaisical in 
our approach to school safety and school violence.  
After Columbine, schools began to realize that 
safety and security were essential to teaching and 
learning. In that era, the Departments of 
Education, Justice and Health and Human Services 
began to collaborate more closely in the design and 
support of programs to make schools safer and 
more secure and students healthier and better 
prepared to deal with conflict. 9-11 was another 
marker because after the events, we realized the 
importance of emergency planning for schools.  
We’re currently in the post 911 phase and it will be 
a few years before we see how the events of that 
day affected schools. There could be a post Katrina 
phase, but it’s too early to say:  we’ll have to see 
whether or not the events of Katrina lead to any 
changes in schools security and emergency 
planning.   
  
 I want to divert for a minute and talk a little bit 
about the events that occurred in Beslan, Russia as 
we {ED} had responsibility for sending a letter out 
to schools after the event.  And I want to take 
somewhat of exception about the inadequacy of 
the letter. The  letter was sent out a few weeks 
after the  Beslan incident and it contained all the 
“factual” information we had regarding the 
incident  In reality, the exercise was  a good lesson 
in how we deal with schools when incidents like 
Beslan occur.  
 
 The FBI/Department of Homeland Security 
developed a letter regarding the incident that they 
were going to send out to the law enforcement 
community. Initially, we were going to send out the 
same letter to the schools, but when we saw that 
letter we realized while it was alright for the law 
enforcement community, it wasn’t what we wanted 
to send out to the schools. We [ED] felt we had a 
responsibility to presentithe facts without 
unnecessarily scaring parents and educators.  We 
can’t say that here are assumptions and here’s 
what we believed to be the case, we have a 
responsibility to the education community to 
present the facts.  Not what we think is true.  Not 
what we would like to be the truth, but what is 
true.  We also have to again present that in such a 
way that it’s understandable to educators and 
parents.  At the same time we have to present it in 
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such a manner that we don’t unnecessarily frighten 
the public because then we’re feeding right into 
the hands of terrorists and we’re doing exactly 
what they want us to do, and that is close down 
schools.   
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Response #1 to: Preparedness and Prevention 
Gregory A. Thomas, MS 
Director, Program for School Planning and Preparedness, 
National Center for Disaster Preparedness, Columbia University 
 
Schools are not built to respond to terrorism:  
schools are primarily there to ensure children 
receive proper education. I have often been asked, 
"how do you plan for the unthinkable like that kind 
of event whether it be 9-11 or an event directed at 
a school?"  And my answer has been you plan for 
the unthinkable by planning for the thinkable.  A 
main problem is that there’s not a 
lot of information sharing.  A lot of 
information that we know about 
from the intelligence standpoint 
should be shared more with schools.  
Law enforcement can play a very 
important role in the development 
safety plans. Having a plan is one 
thing, but knowing how to implement it and how it 
will interplay with law enforcement protocols is 
another. 
 
Establishing Formal Relations between 
Schools and Law Enforcement  
 
In NYC, we transferred the function of school 
security to the New York City Police Department 
(NYPD) in 1998. That action created a formal 
relationship between the school system and the 
New York City Police Department so that in cases of 
an emergency—be it a bomb scare of the events of 
9-11, the resources of the police department could 
be brought in to ensure school safety. I can say 
with certainty that if we had not transferred the 
function of school security to the NYPD in 1998, we 
probably would have lost some children or some 
teachers on 9-11. The response to that disaster was 
based on the fact that it was a separate group in 
the law enforcement community that knew about 
the schools down at Ground Zero. The nine schools 
that were in the impacted area were already 
familiar to the NYPD. As the rest of the department 
focused on the towers and the surrounding areas, 
the Police Department sent teams 
of school safety agents to the 
schools near Ground Zero. The NYPD 
had their eyes and ears on the 
schools from the beginning.  
 
We’re fortunate in New York City to 
have the New York City Police 
Department’s (NYPD) help in development of school 
safety plans. They assist in the development, and 
once a plan is accepted, it is then shared with the 
NYPD.   
   
Working with the Emergency 
Management Community 
 
The next level of response is working with the 
Emergency Management community. On veteran’s 
Day, 2002, a day in which school is not in session in 
NYC, I received a phone call at home from the 
Emergency Management personnel in New York 
City-- an oil tanker had exploded off the shore of 
Staten Island. Terrorism was ruled out quickly, but 
the large fire was a problem that OEM (Office of 
Emergency Management) was paying close 
attention to. When Emergency Management 
 Schools can not be 
“safe” on their own -
the process of safety 
in schools requires 
community based 
school safety planning  
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officials asked me to come down to the office right 
away—I was confused. Schools were closed. They 
didn’t need my input. But they wanted to show me 
their plume tracking software which they had 
linked to school safety plans. They were tracking a 
plume of smoke coming from that oil tanker and 
they could pinpoint which schools would have 
needed to be evacuated, had schools been in 
session that day. It makes perfect sense that in the 
event of an environmental emergency, the 
emergency management community should be the 
agency which instructs schools on what to do---
rather than the school principal watching the event 
unfold on CNN and making a decision based upon 
that. When that kind of conversation is held 
proactively—when school safety officials learn what 
tools emergency managers and law enforcement 
have at their disposal, then in times of 
emergencies, they will know whom to turn to, 
whom to trust. This will increase the confidence of 
school safety officials, principals and in turn, 
parents.   School safety requires collaboration with 
police and fire departments and offices of 
emergency management. Schools can not go at it 





Response #2 to: Preparedness and Prevention 
Joseph F. LeViness 
Coordinator, Mental Health Services, New York State Office of Mental Health 
 
I’ll focus on the psychological aspects of the 
planning. The big cities especially are doing well-- 
some small cities also, but there is still room for 
improvement.   
 
 One of my big concerns is whether we have plans 
in place to take care of children in case of a 
radiological or a chemical attack.  Most likely we 
would be able to secure safety for children in case 
of a dirty bomb (because of the limited range of 
that type of weapon), but what if we have to 
decontaminate large numbers of children?   
 
Cultural considerations in decontamination  
I talked to the New York City 
Interface Disaster Systems, NYCIDS.  
And they are beginning to work with 
cultural and religious leaders in 
different communities about 
situations in which decontamination 
may be required. Will these 
community leaders be willing to 
advise people to consent to the 
decontamination procedures? There are cultural 
and psychological issues which we tend not to think 
about, but I think we should. We have a group of 
people in this city here who are people from the 
holocaust survivors.  Think about running those 
people through a shower.  If you are a Muslim 
woman who has never been seen by her husband 
naked, and you’re asked to strip in the middle of 
the street, would you do it?   If you’ve got 
somebody who is floridly psychotic and you’re 
coming at them in a level 1 suit and you’re telling 
them to take their clothes off and run through a 
shower, you might have some problems.  I’m not 
sure the city and the fire departments and police 
departments have thought about those issues.   
 
Decontamination of Children  
One of the things I think we need to do is to 
proactively teach children about some of these 
things.  Every school has a fire safety week; what if 
during that week, the kids are shown a level 1 suit. 
Let the kids touch it and tell them this is what a 
person who would be helping you would be 
wearing.  We talk to kids about fires.  We talk to 
kids about drugs.  We talk to kids 
about good touch and bad touch.  
After Columbine, we talked to kids 
about lock downs. What is discussed 
should be age appropriate of 
course, but I certainly think that for 
grade school kids, it might be good 
to start exposing them to some of 
the protective gear.    
 
Relocation Issues  
What if a dirty bomb is set off near a daycare 
center? How are we going to make sure that those 
kids get put back with their parents?  I’m especially 
concerned about the little ones who are non-
speaking or who are so little they don’t know their 
own names or the names of their parent(s). I don’t 
have answers to all these issues, but I’m glad we’re 
starting to think about them. Safety issues are 
 We need to address 
cultural and religious 
issues which will 
surface should there 
be a situation in which 
mass decontamination 
is necessary   
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often directly related to mental health.  The safer 
and secure children feel, the more secure parents 
feel. When parents feel secure with the safety of 
their children, they will be more willing to 
cooperate with schools and officials in times of 
emergencies.   
 
Audience discussion & unanswered 
questions:  
 
Could there be a better communication system 
which would allow people to get the information 
directly to the schools? For example, if the plume 
of smoke is going east, how would a school get that 
information in real time?  How do schools receive 
specific information which informs them on issues 




Lunch Time Key Note Address 
Steve Simonson 
Senior Analyst, Rand Corporation 
 
Islam, like Christianity, has well-developed ideas of 
what’s legitimate and what is not legitimate in 
war. In Islam, there is a class of individuals called 
innocents who cannot be targeted.  The religion 
holds the human soul in high esteem and considers 
the attack against innocent human beings a great 
sin.  
 
In fact, after the attacks of September 11th, many 
prominent Muslim jurists made important 
statements condemning the attacks. The mufti of 
Saudi Arabia said that hijacking planes and 
terrorizing innocent people – with the key word 
being innocent - and shedding blood constitute a 
form of injustice that cannot be tolerated by Islam. 
He said that the World Trade Center attacks did 
not reflect honor, which is a very important 
concept among Arabs.  
 
After September 11th, leaders of Islamic 
movements made a public statement condemning 
the attacks against the WTC. They said they 
condemned in the strongest terms the incidents 
which were against all human and Islamic norms.  
God almighty says in the Holy Koran, “no bearer of 
burdens can bear the burden of another.”  They did 
not, however, condemn the attack against the 
Pentagon.   
 
After the London attacks on July 7th, about a 
dozen leaders of the Muslim community in London 
were asked by the British government to issue a 
statement condemning the attacks, which they did.  
It was a very clean statement.  It consisted of a 
couple of quotes from the Koran and that was it. 
 
The scholars made no attempt to actually grapple 
with the underlying reason for the violence. 
Neither did they address the concept of innocents. 
I believe the whole concept of innocents needs to 
be unpacked, and it needs to be unpacked carefully 
against the background of contemporary events.   
 
The debate over who is a legitimate target in war is 
a debate over power within the Muslim community.  
Suffice it to say that this is a very important thing 
happening in Islam. The party in this debate who 
proves to be more influential essentially exceeds to 
a certain kind of power in this broad community.   
 
Muslims have treaties with the United States and 
other countries they’ve attacked; however, it’s a 
great sin to activate a treaty within Islam.  Bin 
Laden concludes that the Muslim leaders who made 
the agreements with western countries were not 
representatives of the faith and therefore the 
treaties they signed were not valid. And even if 
they were valid representatives of the faith and 
able to make treaties, the United States violated 
the terms of those treaties by reeking havoc among 
Muslims and victimizing Muslims.   
 
He then turned to the key question which is what 
we would call rules of engagement against his 
background of defense of war.  Bin Laden argued 
that in certain circumstances it’s permissible to kill 
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civilians.  How can one permit the killing of the 
branch and not permit the killing of the supporting 
trunk?   
 
Where does the dividing line between combatant 
and not combatant lie?   Bin Laden essentially says 
two things.  First, the people that the clerics imply 
to be innocent are not innocent.  And secondly, 
there are clear conditions in which civilians may be 
killed.   
 
Reciprocity  
With respect to children, his first condition is 
immensely important.  It’s the condition of 
reciprocity.  Bin Laden has a scriptural foundation 
for this statement because in the Koran it says, 
“one who attacks you, attack him in like manner as 
he attacked you.”  Bin Laden sites this as the 
justification for the doctrine of reciprocity. 
 
During the first Gulf War, CNN showed images of US 
warplanes dumping 500-pound laser guided bombs 
down chimneystacks.  The US insisted that the 
weapons were essentially flawless.  Obviously no 
weapon can be perfect, but the other side bought 
our propaganda about the accuracy in our weapons.  
So when civilians were killed in consequence of US 
military operations, those civilians’ deaths were 
deemed to be deliberate.   
 
It is widely believed that children were killed in 
Iraq through the implementation of the UN 
sanctions, which were seen as being instigated and 
enforced by the United States.  Many Muslims also 
believe that Israelis deliberately target Muslim 
children. And often the media reinforces that view. 
You remember his picture in the news of a young 
kid who was killed in Gaza about four years ago?  
He was cuddling his father’s arms and he looked 
kind of pressed into a corner.  There was crossfire.  
And the child was killed on camera.  That was seen 
to be a deliberate killing and it stood for a broader 
policy of killing Muslims.   
 
It allows for Muslims to kill protective ones among 
unbelievers as an act of reciprocity. If the 
unbelievers can target Muslim women, children and 
elderly, it is permissible for Muslims to respond in 
kind and kill those similar to those whom the 
unbelievers killed.  This is very powerful argument.  
And the battlefield is where combatants and 
noncombatants co-mingle and it’s very difficult to 
sort the wheat from the chaff.   
 
So he says it is allowed for Muslims to killed 
protected ones among the unbelievers in the event 
of an attack against them in which it is not possible 
to differentiate the protected ones from their 
combatants or from their strongholds.  Now women 
and children enter into the debate at this point.  
He quotes a famous story from the wars in Syria in 
which Muhammad is on the battlefield.  Corpses of 
women and children are distributed on the 
landscape in front of him, and Muhammad is asked 
whether it had been permissible to kill those 
women and children.  And his somewhat cryptic 
reply was “they aren’t from among them”, and 
that statement is often taken to mean that in 
Muhammad’s judgment, in the prophet’s judgment, 
the decision made by those women and children to 
remain with their husbands and fathers who were 
combatants deprived them of noncombatant status.  
And thus they were legitimate targets for the 
Muslim fighters.   
 
Bin Laden takes this line of thinking one step 
farther in a way that is very innovative and 
accepted among Muslim terrorist groups:  he says 
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that Muslims are fighting democracies, and since 
the democracy governments are popularly elected, 
the entire populations of these democracies are 
culpable for the policies implemented by their 
governments.  In making this argument, and it’s a 
very audacious argument within the Muslim legal 
tradition, he basically erases the category of 
noncombatant that is hitherto existed in that 
tradition.   
 
Bin Laden says it is now allowable for Muslims to 
kill unprotected ones among unbelievers on the 
condition that the protected ones had assisted in 
combat whether in deed, word or mind or any 
other form of assistance according to prophetic 
command.  
 
He expands on that saying that whatever decisions 
the non-Muslims (Americans) make, especially 
critical decisions which involve war, it has taken 
face on opinion polls and on voting within the 
House or Representatives, the Senate which 
represent directly the exact opinions of people 
they represent.  Based on this, any American who 
voted for war is like a fighter or at least a 
supporter.  So we’re all in their gun sights.  
 
Bin Laden has said “The Americans have still not 
tasted from our hands what we have tasted from 
theirs.  We have not reached (parity) with them.  
We have the right to kill 4 million Americans, 2 
million children, exile twice as many and wound 
and cripple thousands”.  He also goes on to say this 
is the justification for the use of chemical and 
biological weapons so as to afflict them – that is 
the enemies of the Muslims – with the single 
maladies they have afflicted the Muslims because 
of the American’s use of chemical and biological 
weapons. Now this thinking is not just confined to 
the ivory towers of Islamic jurisprudence; this 
reasoning has spread quite far and wide.   
 
 I’m going to close with a story of a famous Islamic 
cleric, who just until a couple weeks ago, was 
living in London. In the wake of Beslan he was 
interviewed by the Sunday Telegraph, which is a 
prominent British broadcast--a little bit on the 
conservative side. He said he would support 
hostage taking at British schools if carried out by 
terrorists with “just cause.”  He used technical 
vocabulary (that we have heard before) and used it 
to justify what had taken place is Beslan.  He 
argued further that if any Muslim carried out an 
attack like that in Britain, it would be justified 
because Britain has carried out acts of terrorism in 
Iraq.  So here you have someone who is on the right 
side of the spectrum in Britain but in the leader of 
a movement who has never up to that point 
violated British law and who had previously 
adopted this soviet pro-life view, but whose views 
had been changed in the context of the changing 
direction of the debate within Muslim 
jurisprudence about the dividing line, the rapidly 






Topic 3: System Capacity 
Speaker: Robert Kanter, M.D. 
Professor of Pediatrics, SUNY Upstate Medical Center 
 
I’d like to talk with you about national objectives 
for the hospital care of children in disasters.  I’d 
like to think about how well those national 
objectives stand up to quantitative scrutiny and 
how well balanced are the projected needs for 
hospital care against existing resources.  Are there 
gaps? If so, what might we do to narrow those gaps?   
 
National Objectives and Guidelines 
Federal agencies have suggested that we prepare 
to take care of disaster surges of 500 new hospital 
inpatients per million population. 500 is an 
arbitrary number, but it’s 
reasonable for planning purposes. 
Regional and statewide planning is 
critical. Individual hospitals can not 
work alone during a surge.  The 
objective during a surge should be 
to maximize the number of lives 
saved. That’s quite different than 
our current approach in routine 
care, which is to use all necessary resources in 
order to maximize the chance of saving each 
individual life.  If we provide unlimited care to 
individuals during a mass casualty event, we’d 
overwhelm the system and compromise most 
outcomes.  We’d like to develop guidelines that are 
general as well as event specific. Any framework 
that we develop should be applicable to ordinary, 
daily routines as well as extraordinary events. To 
have an infrastructure that works well in a disaster 
response, it needs to have a foundation which 
supports good outcomes in daily events.  
Are existing resources sufficient to accommodate 
surges of 500 new hospital inpatients per million 
population in a terrorist event? If existing resources 
are not sufficient, are there realistic modifications 
that might extend those resources and allow us to 
do a better job in meeting national targets?   
 
Routine hospital care of children 
Let’s start with some data about how hospitals are 
actually used now in the routine care of children.  
Most of this information comes from our work in 
New York State, but I think it may generalize 
reasonably well to other states.  
Each day in New York State, on 
average, 1600 kids and 38,000 
adults are receiving inpatient care. 
The routine pediatric needs are 
much smaller than the adult needs 
and so it makes sense that the 
hospitals resources for children will 
be more limited.  In addition, the 
rate of child hospitalization per year is decreasing 
by about 2.3% a year.  From a pediatric public 
health point of view, that’s good news. However, 
it’s worth remembering that as routine hospital 
care of children decreases, the resources for 
pediatric disaster care in hospitals have also 
decreased in recent years.   
 
The largest number of routine child hospitalizations 
are due to ambulatory care sensitive conditions 
such as asthma, gastroenteritis and respiratory 
tract infections. In disaster situations, those 
ambulatory care sensitive conditions will still exist; 
 We have fewer 
pediatric beds now 
than we did ten years 
ago.  In the event of 
mass pediatric 
casualties, this could 
be a problem.  
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in fact, you can imagine that if primary care is 
interrupted, those illnesses may become more 
acute. If certain unfavorable environmental 
conditions occur, those illnesses may be 
exacerbated. This occurred in New Orleans after 
Hurricane Katrina. 
 
A second important group to consider are children 
hospitalized for mental illnesses.  Children are 
being hospitalized for mental illness at a rate that 
is increasing by 5% a year during a recent seven 
year period. Children with mental illness are only 
going to become more vulnerable in a disaster 
situation. 
 
There’s an overlap geographically between those 
areas that have high health risks, particularly high 
hospitalization rates, with concentrated 
socioeconomic disadvantage.  The 
zip codes in New York State with 
the highest hospitalization rates for 
children are also the zip codes with 
very high poverty rates, youth crime 
rates, youth drug abuse rates, and 
school failure rates. In any major 
community emergency, the people in those 
neighborhoods are going to be far more vulnerable 
to the bad effects of the disaster than others.  
Again, this is something we saw in New Orleans 
after the hurricane.  
 
Routine hospital capacity 
How many patients can we accommodate?  New 
York State has a maximum of 700 beds per million 
children for pediatric care and 3,000 beds per 
million adults for the care of adults. Average 
occupancy is about 60% for children and 82% for 
adults.   
What is the current capacity of hospitals to care for 
children? By capacity, I’m referring not only to the 
availability of the staffed bed, but the capacity of 
providing specialized care for the higher risk, more 
complex illnesses in the sickest children.  Out of 
the 242 hospitals currently in operation in New 
York State, 42 of them are caring for about 2/3 of 
all hospitalized children.  Presumably the other 1/3 
are kids with mild or common low risk conditions; 
they are being treated in hospitals that don’t have 
specialized pediatric services.  If you define 
pediatric hospitals as those facilities that have 
residency teaching accreditation, as well as a high 
volume of pediatric cases and a high diversity of 
pediatric diagnoses, there are 11 such hospitals 
statewide. 
  
One worrisome fact is that if you study the use of 
existing resources in ordinary daily 
activities there is a good deal of 
variation in how well existing 
pediatric hospital resources are 
used.  There may be some barriers 
to using resources even though 
they’re available in New York State.  
If that’s true in routine daily activity, one wonders 
if similar barriers may occur in a disaster situation.   
 
Capacity in disasters 
Now what about disaster responses?  Let me start 
by making some optimistic assumptions so we can 
proceed with the analysis. Let’s assume that in a 
disaster, children can be appropriately distributed 
to the pediatric and non-pediatric hospitals 
according to how severely ill or injured they are.  
Let’s assume for simplicity that we’re talking about 
the early capacity immediately after a discreet 
event and not a protracted epidemic.  Let’s just 
consider the hospital phase of care.  Other 
 Children who are 
vulnerable on a daily 
basis will become 
even more vulnerable 
during a disaster.  
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researchers and other planners have done quite a 
lot of work on the pre-hospital phase and the 
emergency department phase of management.  Not 
many people have thought about what happens a 
few hours down the line once you’ve stabilized the 
situation and now you have a large number that 
require hospital care.   
  
How many children can we take care of in the 
hospital on short notice?  Using our study of daily 
hospital occupancy, we estimate the number of 
available vacant beds as being the difference 
between the peak and the average census.   
  
New York State can accommodate fewer than 300 
new patients per million children in a hospital bed, 
which is considerably under the target of 500 per 
million.  For adults we can accommodate just over 
500 new patients per million adults, which meets 
national objectives. Remember these are just 
averages.  Sometimes we’d be able to do better.  
Sometimes we wouldn’t be able to do even this 
well.   
  
How much can we expand that capacity by a 
discretionary reduction of occupancy, by 
discharging patients early and by canceling 
admissions for children who don’t need to be 
admitted?  Insight for this comes from the events 
around 9/11/2001. 9/11 was a major disaster for 
which hospitals immediately began to try to open 
up as many beds as possible.  And we can tell how 
successful they were, because unfortunately there 
were not very many people who needed to be 
hospitalized.  Statewide in New York there was 
very little change in the hospital census, but in 
New York City there really was a change.  Starting 
at a baseline occupancy on 9/10, pediatric beds 
were only a little over half filled before that 
disaster. Adults’ beds were at 82% of their 
capacity. During that week pediatric hospital 
occupancy declined by 9% relative to the baseline.  
Adult occupancy fell by 8% relative to the baseline.  
One might argue that because it became apparent 
very quickly that large numbers of inpatient beds 
wouldn’t be needed, maybe patients were not 
aggressively discharged. So perhaps we could’ve 
opened up even more capacity.  
  
Well to move on from here and consider large 
surges of patients, we’re dealing with events that 
really have never been encountered.  If we want to 
think about it quantitatively, we need to do this in 
a simulation methodology. What’s the probability 
that the New York City region could rapidly 
accommodate 500 new inpatients per million 
population?  NYC has 1.6 million children 14 years 
old and younger, so the federal surge target of 500 
per million corresponds to 800 new pediatric 
hospital inpatients.  
  
What strategies might improve capacity?  We have 
explored two very simple ideas.   
(1) Discharge patients who don’t need to be there 
and cancel the next days’ scheduled admissions. 
Let’s assume that we can increase vacancy by 20% 
by doing that.  That’s a little better than we did 
after 9/11, but I think it’s realistic.   
(2) Increase the capacity for the care of new 
patients by changing standards of care, reducing 
the standards of care a little bit so you have more 
resources to go around for more patients.  The 
outcome for individual patients may be 
compromised, but you can take care of many more 
patients, thus improving the overall outcome. Our 
simulation calculations show that if all hospitals 
were in operation, if we increased vacancies by 20% 
by discretionary reduction of occupancy, and if we 
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altered standards of care to double the capacity for 
new admissions, we could reliably accommodate 
500 per million new disaster victims, meeting 
federal objectives.  
 
What if hospitals themselves were 
targeted?  
 
All of these projections assume that all of our 
resources are still available.  What about darker 
scenarios?  What if our hospital resources have 
been degraded by some aspect of the disaster, if 
some hospitals were targeted, the 
power is out, staff can’t make it to 
work, some essential supplies run out? 
Assume that our resources have 
decreased by 40%. If that were the 
case, then we would be unable to 
accommodate the care of even 200 per 
million new pediatric inpatients.  
However, if you then go on and use the 
strategies that we just talked about– discretionary 
discharges, discretionary cancellations, and change 
the standards of care so that we can care for twice 
as many patients with the remaining staff that are 
available, we would do much better. We would 
reliably accommodate nearly 400 new patients per 
million population. If we changed standards of care 
to even more strictly limit interventions to only 
lifesaving care, we might quadruple capacity for 
new patients. Then essential care could be 
provided reliably to 500 per million, thus meeting 
federal targets. The simulations show that we need 
to develop ways to improve surge capacity. The 
simple strategies of discretionary occupancy 
reduction and altering our standards of care may 
allow us to extend existing staff and equipment  
resources to take care of larger numbers of 
patients.  The hard work remains to be done.  What  
alterations in standards of care are feasible and 
clinically acceptable?  
 
What kind of tradeoffs will there be in outcomes 
between lower standards of care and 
accommodating larger numbers of patients versus 
routine standards of care that exclude many 
patients from care?  Who makes the decision to 
alter care? What criteria would we use to make this 
decision? What are the procedures, and how much 
practice do we need to make them effective? Once 
a disaster happens, responders have a 
way of swinging into action.  We have 
magnificent resources.  The question 
is whether we will be smart enough, 
organized enough, and resourceful 
enough to work effectively in a 
disaster.  
 
To read more about our observations 
on pediatric hospital capacity and simulations 
exploring disaster response strategies, see: 
1. On line publication  
doi:10.1016/j.annemergmed.2006.10.019 
2. Pediatrics 2007;119:94-100. 
 
 We will often have 
difficulty 
accommodating 
surges at the 
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There is a predictable nature to the types of 
injuries that we see in terrorist bombings, and this 
can work to our advantage as we figure out what 
systems need to be in place to best plan for the 
pediatric patients who are involved.  In the 
Oklahoma City bombing, 66 of 816 casualties were 
children.  Of the 47 children who were injured but 
survived, only 15% required hospitalization. Most of 
the children who died were seated by the window 
near the daycare center near the epicenter of the 
blast.    This is a scene that is repeated throughout 
the disaster literature. In general, 
after a major blast, there are three 
groups of patients: many who are 
far enough away from the blast that 
their injuries are relatively minor, a 
small number who are fatally 
injured, and a small number of 
those who are in the “penumbra” of 
the blast and need to be hospitalized for their 
injuries—around 15% in total.  A smaller percentage 
of these patients will require critical care.   
 
Israel has given us some sense of what happens 
after a bomb blast.  The prehospital procedures 
after a bombing in Israel are somewhat different 
than ours in the United States, and much less 
complex, due to the inherently dangerous 
environment of the blast site.  Israel’s emergency 
response is a group effort—first responders (many 
of them off duty volunteers) typically arrive before 
the ambulances arrive. Everyone has a clear 
understanding that secondary explosions could 
occur, so the goal is to get the patients away from 
the scene as quickly as possible.  Evacuation times 
are very fast and victims are typically evacuated to 
multiple facilities.  This also emphasizes the role 
that receiving hospitals play in the process, and 
establishes an important point that the closest 
hospital is typically the receiving hospital, 
regardless of its capacities or prior designation. 
 
When the 9/11 disaster occurred in New York City, 
most hospitals invoked their disaster plans.  In 
order to free up pediatric bed for 
possible patients, children who 
were stable were discharged.  While 
hospital staff were waiting for the 
influx of injuries that never came, 
they asked these questions:   What 
if the plane actually hit the daycare 
center?  Were they ready to handle 
100 critically injured kids?  Were they ready for 
possible radiation poisoning?  What would they do if 
the emergency department became contaminated? 
This was a wake up call in the sense that it exposed 
the liabilities of plans that exist largely on paper 
only. 
 
When we think about planning for pediatric 
terrorism-related trauma, we must understand that 
injuries are to be expected. As a general rule, the 
pediatric patients have injuries that are consistent 
with those seen in the adult population.   Most 
children will be injured in closed or confined 
spaces rather than open spaces, which increases 
 Pediatrics is all 
about the pediatric 
chain of survival: 
prevention, access, 
life support and 
specialized care.  
 29 
the magnitude of the forces. Severely injured 
survivors will require early surgery and specialized 
care in a pediatric intensive care unit (PICU), 
followed by lengthy physical and psychological 
hospitalization and rehabilitation. 
 
In terms of mitigating the response, we can expect 
that patients who are alive during the first hour 
will be taken to the closest hospitals, whether they 
are pediatric-capable or not. So far as the hospital 
is concerned, we have to remember a few things: 
the numbers of nurses and staffed PICU beds 
determines a hospital’s capability to care for 
critically ill patients, as do the numbers of x-ray 
machines and technicians, and the hospital’s 
capacity for perform emergency surgery.  
 
In general, a region’s hospital capacity to receive 
and treat blast-related injuries among adults is 
likely adequate in most areas, unless the regional 
trauma center is primary or 
secondary target.  But this is not so 
true for children because of the 
limited, and occasionally 
centralized, pediatric emergency 
care, PICU care, and pediatric acute 
care, or availability of bed space, in 
that region.   
 
Prevention means education and preparation.  
Access means getting the patient to the right place 
at the right time. We developed a new prehospital 
triage model for use in New York City. A 
modification of the Jump-START Triage System that 
is used nationwide, its fundamental operating 
assumptions are these: that all children are critical 
if they can’t walk and talk; and that no children 
are pronounced dead until have had at least the 
opportunity to be ventilated with a bag and mask 
for a short period of time.   
 
In Manhattan, this is where we stand at the 
moment: the population exceeds one and one half 
million, with a population density of nearly 67,000 
people per square mile, and a pediatric population 
that is relatively stable. There are approximately 
400,000 kids in New York City during a school day. 
Where are we now in terms of pediatric 
preparation?  Fewer emergency physicians than we 
need have disaster training and experience.  Most 
EMS training and emergency resuscitation based 
courses focus primarily on adult populations.   
 
At the National Blast Injury Awareness Conference 
in Washington in May of 2005, the Surgeon General, 
VADM Richard Carmona, who is an emergency 
physician, recited to the assembled group what he 
saw as the five most likely bomb threats:  
1. Bomb in a bus stop;  
2. Bomb in a fast food restaurant;  
3. A single kilogram TNT from a car 
bomb;  
4. Many syncronized bombs;  
5. Bombs contaminated with a 
chemical, biological or radiological 
substance.   
 
Perhaps the worst-case scenario would be   
ambulance truck bombs detonating in a hospital, 
especially a children’s hospital. It will take 24 to 72 
hours to ramp up a federal response – what former 
Air Force Surgeon General Paul “PK” Carlton refers 
to as the “red wedge”.  Existing local resources will 
need to handle the initial 24 to 72 hours of care 
until Federal or other supplemental assets arrive, 
but in a way that does not disrupt the rest of the 
health care system. 
 
 
 The initial response 
to disaster is always 
local. The federal 
aspects will take 
about 24-72 hours 
to arrive. 
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Indirect Victimization and Psychological 
Impact 
  
If we start at 9/11 and we say, what’s happened 
since then that might be responsible for an ongoing 
assault on the psychological well being of children?  
If you think about it, we immediately after 9/11 
had the anthrax situation, which was terrifying, you 
know, I remember telling people to tell their 
children not to open the mail.  But the fact is that 
there was a great deal of discontentment and 
anxiety about anthrax in the environment, and that 
was not missed by children.  That amount of focus 
and attention and nightly news coverage was 
another reminder that the world was pretty 
dangerous  after 9/11.  In New York City, we had a 
very bizarre, tragic accident of an American 
Airlines flight crashing in the city limits in New York 
weeks after the 9/11 bombing. The sniper 
shootings, while not really strictly terrorism, 
dominated the news for, you know, weeks and 
weeks and people, you know, going shopping, going 
to 7-11, getting shot by an unknown assassin.  
Again, I’m mentioning this because, think about 
this as an ongoing movie picture that children are 
watching, starting on 9/11 and going forward.  The  
wars, the images from the wars, the ongoing terror 
attacks in Madrid and London, the smallpox 
vaccination debacle in 2002 where the threat of a 
smallpox outbreak was discussed. And then the 
images of chaos and social disruption out of New 
Orleans and the Gulf region.  All of this represents 
an ongoing trajectory of violent images and  
unsettling, weird realities in the lives of American  
children since 9/11. So putting it all together, 
again, as a pediatrician, you have to worry here 
that we’re exposing to kids to an awful lot of things 
that are understandably unsettling.  I’m so pleased 
to be able to welcome Dr. Betty Pfefferbaum to the 
podium. She is a leader in the field of childhood 
trauma and has published many, many important 
studies. There really is no one better qualified to 





Effects of Direct Exposure to Terrorism in Children 
Betty Pfefferbaum, M.D., J.D. 
Paul and Ruth Jonas Chair, Professor and Chairman 
Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences  
University of Oklahoma College of Medicine 
Director, Terrorism and Disaster Center of the National Child Traumatic Stress Network 
 
Introduction  
Unfortunately, terrorism in this country and abroad 
has not spared children and the literature on the 
effects of exposure to domestic and international 
events is growing rapidly. Research suggests that 
emotional outcomes of disasters are related to the 
magnitude of the event and exposure, measured 
quantitatively, for example, in physical distance 
and in degree or perception of danger. Reflecting 
the goal of terrorism to create chaos and generate 
widespread fear and changes in attitudes and 
behaviors, investigators have examined population-
based effects of these events in disaster-affected 
communities (see e.g., Fairbrother et al. 2003; 
Hoven et al. 2005; Pfefferbaum et al. 1999; Stuber 
et al. 2005) and in areas remote from the disaster 
site (see e.g., Hock et al. 2004; Pfefferbaum et al. 
2003; Schlenger et al. 2002; Schuster et al. 2001). 
Some studies have included directly exposed 
children in samples addressing the September 11 
attacks (e.g., Hoven et al., 2005) and events in 
Israel (e.g., Pat-Horenczyk et al. 2007). Less 
research has focused specifically on the children 
most directly exposed to these incidents, perhaps 
due to the relatively few numbers of children 
physically present at the disaster scene, the fact 
that many children who were present perished, and 
the difficulty accessing those who survive. While 
not an exhaustive review, this paper addresses 
what we know about the effects of terrorism on 
directly exposed children—those physically present 
at the site of an attack and those in close enough 
proximity to eye witness the event (especially if 
their proximity places them in danger)—
concentrating on acute and near-term reactions, 




It is difficult to conduct research in the early 
aftermath of disasters when attention is focused on 
security, safety, and physical consequences. Galili-
Weisstub and Benarroch (2004) studied 260 young 
victims seen in emergency rooms in Jerusalem right 
after a terrorist event. Most of the children 
suffered minor physical injuries and were 
discharged from care within hours of being seen. 
Eighteen percent exhibited pathological acute 
stress reactions including dissociative states, 
conversion reactions, intense anxiety, and 
psychotic reactions. 
 
A retrospective study of adolescents in New York 
City six to nine months after the September 11 
attacks revealed that over 15% of adolescents met 
criteria for a probable peri-event panic attack on 
the day of the event (Pfefferbaum et al. 2006). 
While this study did not focus exclusively on 
adolescents physically present at the site, 
approximately 10% reported seeing the attacks in 
person and over 50% reported leaving school early 
on the day of the attacks. A probable peri-event 
panic attack strongly correlated with subsequent 
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probable PTSD and probable subthreshold PTSD six 
to nine months later. The investigators noted that 
peri-event panic attacks may be a normal fear 
response or may represent symptoms of acute 
stress disorder (Pfefferbaum et al. 2006). 
 
Near-Term Reactions 
Posttraumatic stress and other reactions are 
common in children directly exposed to terrorist 
incidents. For example, Koplewicz and colleagues 
(2002) found that children who were trapped in the 
World Trade Center at the time of the 1993 
bombing of the facility had significantly higher 
levels of posttraumatic stress and disaster-related 
fear than children in a community comparison 
sample. Children who reported the strongest 
symptoms initially were most likely to have strong 
persisting symptoms. Of note, parents failed to 
recognize the level of distress in their children, 
reporting a decrease in child posttraumatic stress 
and incident-related fear between three and nine 
months while the children themselves reported no 
decrease.  
 
More than one third of parents of preschool-aged 
children attending early childhood centers, 
primarily near or within view of the World Trade 
Center at the time of the September 11 attacks, 
reported that their children had personally 
witnessed at least part of the event (DeVoe et al. 
2006). Over one half reported new fears in their 
children, almost one fourth reported increased 
aggression, and over 40% reported that their 
children experienced difficulty going to sleep 
after the event (DeVoe et al. 2006).  
 
A study of children, aged 6 to 14 years, held 
hostage for three days in a school-based terrorist 
incident in Beslan, Russia, in 2004, revealed very 
high levels of posttraumatic stress symptoms three 
months after the attack (Scrimin et al. 2006). 
Approximately three fourths of the children met 
the study’s criteria for PTSD, and many 
experienced neuropsychological impairment in 
working memory and sustained attention (Scrimin 
et al. 2006).    
 
In the largest study of the effects of terrorism on 
United States school-aged children to date, Hoven 
and colleagues (2005) examined a representative 
sample of over 8,000 New York City public school 
children (grades 4 through 12) in 94 public schools 
six months after September 11 to examine 
exposure to the disaster, pre-September 11 
trauma, and post-September 11 adjustment. The 
sampling strategy included schools in the 
immediate vicinity of the World Trade Center. The 
children studied evidenced higher than expected 
population rates of posttraumatic stress disorder 
(11%), major depression (8%), generalized anxiety 
(10%), agoraphobia (15%), and separation anxiety 
(12%) though a direct link between these disorders 
and the September 11 attacks was not established. 
Higher rates of measured disorders correlated with 
severity of exposure to the event. Children directly 
exposed to the incident (e.g., fled the disaster 
site) and those whose family members were 
exposed (e.g., family member killed, injured, or 
escaped unhurt) were at greater risk for 
posttraumatic stress disorder than children in other 
parts of the city (Hoven et al. 2005).  
 
Long-Term Effects 
Very little is known about the long-term effects of 
direct exposure to terrorism. Desivilya and 
colleagues (1996) studied a sample of Israeli adults 
who had been taken hostage while on a school field 
trip during their adolescence. Overall, the level of 
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psychiatric symptoms among survivors was in the 
low-to-moderate range but was significantly higher 
than levels in the demographically-matched 
comparison sample. With respect to interpersonal 
adjustment, survivors reported significantly greater 
fear of abandonment and fear of closeness than 
controls, but were not significantly different in 
marital adjustment, parenting styles, and 
effectiveness of family functioning. With respect to 
vocational adjustment, survivors had significantly 
lower job stability than controls. 
 
Living With Chronic Threat 
Pat-Horenczyk and colleagues (2007) examined 695 
adolescents living with chronic threat of terrorism 
in a commonly-targeted neighborhood in Jerusalem 
to explore the effects of repeated exposure to 
terrorist incidents over a 22-month period of 
repeated attack. Approximately one third of the 
adolescents reported personal exposure to an 
incident (having a close friend or relative killed or 
injured in an attack as well as being present at an 
incident) and over one fifth reported a near-miss 
experience. Only 7.6% of the sample met criteria 
for probable PTSD. This seemingly low rate may be 
due to social factors such as compulsory military 
service and an increased sense of self-efficacy, 
high levels of social support in a society braced for 
repeated attack, and rapid return to routine as 
well as to developmental characteristics of 
adolescence such as denial of danger and personal 
vulnerability. Approximately one fifth of the 
adolescents studied reported functional impairment 
in at least one domain. In another report, Pat-
Horenczyk and colleagues (2006) described the 
ability of Israeli adolescents to maintain routine 
activities in the face of chronic exposure to 
terrorism.  
Conclusions 
Research on children directly exposed to 
terrorism involves children across the age-span 
from pre-school to adolescence and includes 
studies of children exposed to single incidents 
and those living in environments where multiple 
incidents have occurred and the threat is 
chronic. While some children suffer serious 
adverse consequences that persist for months and 
years, many children are resilient. Future studies 
should take a systematic approach to determine 
the factors that create risk for adverse outcome 
and those that promote resilience including 
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Dr. Pfefferbaum’s concluding line is a terrific 
lead in for our discussion, which is how to foster 
resiliency in children.  While some children suffer 
serious adverse consequences after trauma—
consequences that persist for months and years, 
many children are resilient. We want to explore 
this topic, so that perhaps more children can be 
given the tools they need in order to survive and 
even thrive after traumatic events.  
 
First, a quick definition of resilency: resiliency is a 
dynamic process wherein individuals display 
positive adaptation despite experiences of 
significant adversity or trauma. At the 
Preparedness and Resilience program, we see 
resiliency as a process-- a process that can be 
experienced by any child, if he or she is given the 
correct tools. That is an important statement 
because there is a theory of the “resilient child”, 
that there is a special class of child who inherited 
personality traits of optimism and high locus of 
control which enables resiliency.  Temperament, 
cognitive functioning, self-efficacy and intelligence 
are examples of internal resources often cited as 
related to positive outcomes. In addition, 
enhancement of self-esteem and generalized 
efficacy, improved communication and conflict 
mediation skills, and other domains of cognitive 
problem-solving skillfulness are related to 
increased resiliency. We believe that internal 
resources are extremely valuable—but they are only 
a part of the picture.  A combination of positive 
internal resources, family system functioning, and 
external resources all work together to promote 
healthy functioning and recovery following a 
traumatic event.  What seems to make a significant 
difference is how these aspects function both 
individually and collectively to influence a child’s 
future functioning.   
 
So now let’s talk about how children responded to 
the trauma on 9/11.    
 
The Children’s Health Fund, a national organization 
committed to medically underserved children and 
families, commissioned a series of polls from the 
Marist Institute to assess the impact of the 9/11 on 
children and families three weeks, three months, 
six months and one year later. Standard survey 
design was used in each to randomly select parents 
of ~450 NYC children aged 4 18 years. Poll results 
from a made it very clear that potentially 
problematic child reactions to the events of 9/11 
were not restricted to those who lived or went to 
school near the World Trade Center site. For the 
first six months after the attacks, reported 
increased child concern about safety was stable at 
52%; with about the same percent concerned that 
another terrorist attack was imminent. Concern 
was consistently highest children of lower income 
families, who were more likely to show school-
related problems including school refusal.  
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The greatest degree of impact on children was 
noted for the city’s poorest borough, the Bronx, 
which is 48% Hispanic, 36% African-American, and 
15% white. The median household income is 
$24,031 with 42% children living in poverty (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2000).  
 
During the six month period, behaviors suggestive 
of depression, and sleep disturbance declined while 
more subtle signs of distress increased - regressive 
behavior (34% to 37%) and somatic complaints (15% 
to 19%). There was minimal variation based on 
child age, borough of residence, or family income, 
although consistently the borough with the lowest 
median household income (the Bronx) had the 
highest degree of concern about safety (62% at six 
months after 9/11). The most frequently cited 
source of support was other family members (55%) 
followed by place of worship (32%). Parents looked 
primarily to schools for help about their children’s 
reactions (70%) while only 29% reported receiving 
any special help from that source.  
 
That parents looked to schools to help after the 
terrorist attacks was not surprising.  Many experts 
agree that schools are a natural connection to 
communities and an important part of nurturing 
resilience in children. Werner and Smith’s (1989) 
study, covering more than 40 years, found that 
among the most frequently encountered positive 
role models in the lives of resilient children 
(outside of the family circle), was a favorite 
teacher who was not just an instructor for 
academic skills for the youngsters but also a 
confidant and positive role model for personal 
identification. (Benard, 1995). “Resilient youth 
take the opportunity to fulfill the basic human 
need for social support, caring, and love.  If this 
opportunity is unavailable to them in their 
immediate family environment, it is imperative 
that the school give them a chance to develop 
caring relationships” (Benard, 1993).   
 
A positive relationship with even one adult has 
been shown to foster resiliency in children who are 
exposed to chronic community violence. Children 
exposed to violence have a risk of becoming 
depressed, anxious and/or violent themselves. 
However, studies have shown that exposed children 
who have a positive relationship with at least one 
adult tend to fare better than children who are 
exposed yet do not have a positive relationship.  
 
Because significant evidence shows that a child’s 
ability to succeed occurs with the presence of one 
positive adult role model, it is important to 
facilitate as many naturally occurring healthy 
adult-child relationships as possible. There are 
many school based resiliency programs which are 
designed to assist children, parents and teachers. 
Unfortunately, going into detail about them is 
beyond the scope of this short discussion.  In the 
Center’s forthcoming publication, “Fostering 
Resiliency in Children”, we discuss the merits of 
several programs and attempt to put them in 
developmental and cultural contexts. There is one 
thing that we believe any school based program 
should have as its base: an emphasis on 
empowerment. The program should draw and build 
upon children’s strengths, capabilities and self 
sufficiency.  
 
On a policy and professional level, it is important 
to insure that children with pre-existing mental 
health conditions are not excluded from eligibility 
for mental health care after a major disaster or 
crisis. Such children may be especially vulnerable 
to post-traumatic stress reactions and a range of 
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other mental health problems after a wide scale 
event. 
 
Finally, we believe that professionals who care for 
children need to be trained to understanding 
mental health issues impacting children post 
disasters. This includes having a better 
understanding and practice with differential 
diagnosis in particular of disorders such as PTSD, 
ASD, Adjustment Disorders and other anxiety and 
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